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Abstract 
This work is a contribution to the Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism that 
studies fiscal federalism through contemporary economic and industrial organization theory. 
First, it establishes context by introducing the two classic motivations in support of 
federalism, namely, incentives and knowledge. Second, it succinctly discusses the incentive-
based organizational approach of the SGT. Third, it shows that the Tiebout model already 
embeds an organizational approach, which instead rests on a knowledge motivation. The 
underlying theme is that the SGT should include both the incentive and knowledge 
motivations for fiscal decentralization. (91 words.) 
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1. Introduction 
The starting point of fiscal federalism – or the economic analysis of decentralized public 
governance – is that there are some economic functions that a central government should 
simply not be concerned with. Granted this, the substantive issue is organizational: to 
precisely define which functions should be centralized and which should be left to local 
jurisdictions (e.g., should health care and education be centralized or local?). Since the 
definition of the local versus central function most often also coincides with the public 
financing question – e.g., if local government is responsible for garbage collection, then 
should it also extract the garbage collection tax?
1 – the public organizational issue has 
become the staple of the public economist rather than of the organizational economist. 
  Apparently, in fact, the research of the public economist and the organizational 
economist is unrelated. Though both make use of the tools and reasoning principles of 
economics, public economists specialize in understanding the theory and practice of 
government intervention in terms of spending and taxation, and organizational economists in 
understanding industry structure and policy as well as the firm. 
  Recently, boundaries have been crossed. Fiscal federalism is now beginning to be 
analyzed through the lens of contemporary industrial and economic organization theory.
2 
  The organizational approach that is emerging in local public finance has been called 
by Qian and Weingast (1997) Second Generation Theory of fiscal federalism (SGT). The 
present paper is concerned with the emerging SGT. It shows that the organizational approach 
                                                 
1 Frey (2001) subtly shifts the foundation of this taxation question from the hierarchy of governments to the spatial scope of 
governments. He suggests that the first best solution to this problem is “functional, overlapping, and competing 
jurisdictions,” namely, competing governments without territorial monopoly. A proposal that, parenthetically, can seemingly 
be traced back as far as Montesquieu (1989[1748]); compare also Ostrom (1987[1971], pp. 129-30) and Boschken (1982) on 
the Federalist (2001[1787-1788]). Frey is optimistic about his proposal if it is constitutionally established, although he 
obviously recognizes the nonnegligible difficulties of achieving it. Volckart (2002) shows the existence of such governance 
structure in European history, but is more skeptical than Frey about the possibility of achieving it today. 
2 See, inter alia, Weingast (1995), Crémer et al. (1996), Seabright (1996), Garzarelli and Limam (2003), Tommasi and 
Weinschelbaum (2003), Garzarelli (2004), Josselin and Marciano (2004), and Oates (2004).   2 
of the SGT is in actual fact not so novel and tries to argue for a more balanced approach. The 
sections that follow 
•  establish context by quickly introducing the two classic motivations in support of 
federalism; 
•  suggest that other theories of public economics already implied an organizational 
approach; 
•  show that another, though complementary, organizational design view of public sector 
decentralization is implicit in Tiebout (1956); 
•  and, overall, argue that the positive heuristic of the SGT should also include the 
organizational approach implicit in Tiebout. 
2. The Two Classic Motivations in Favor of Federalism 
It is possible to identify two classic motivations, which are actually the two faces of the same 
coin, favoring federalism. 
  The first motivation is incentive-based. It asserts that decentralized public governance 
is able to limit better than its centralized alternative the concentration of power in the hands 
of the few or the one. The rationale is simple: federalism aids the separation of powers by 
dividing a state into smaller, federated states. Differently put, federalism is seen as enhancing 
accountability in public governance, thus limiting inefficient behavior of various sorts. This 
motivation for decentralization is found especially in such classics as Montesquieu 
(1989[1748]), Blackstone (1960[1765]), the Federalist (2001[1787-1788]), de Tocqueville 
(1990[1835], Ch. 8, p. 160), and Acton (1967[1907], p. 98). (We may in many ways consider 
this motivation as the economic equivalent of the familiar political checks and balances one.) 
  The second motivation is knowledge-based. It asserts that, contrary to its centralized 
alternative, decentralized public governance performs a beneficial cognitive function   3 
because, thanks to local jurisdictions, it is possible for citizens to more easily communicate 
their needs to government.
3 This other classic motivation is found in the Federalist 
(2001[1787-1788],  e.g., Papers No. 30-36, pp. 145-79; see esp. p. 172) and in de 
Tocqueville’s  Democracy in America. For example: in “great centralized nations the 
legislator is obliged to give a character of uniformity to the laws, which does not always suit 
the diversity of customs and of districts; as he takes no cognizance of special cases, he can 
only proceed upon general principles; and the population are obliged to conform to the 
requirements of the laws, since legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and the 
customs of the population, which is a great cause of trouble and misery. This disadvantage 
does not exist in confederations; Congress regulates the principal measures of the national 
government, and all the details of the administration are reserved to the provincial 
legislatures” (de Tocqueville 1990[1835], Ch. 8, p. 163, emphasis added). 
  As the next section shall elaborate, the more familiar theory of fiscal federalism – 
henceforth referred to as First Generation Theory or FGT – though primarily taking its basic 
inspiration from both de Tocqueville and the Federalist ( e.g., Oates 1972, 1999), has 
primarily picked up the thread of the knowledge motivation. While the SGT has so far only 
focused on the incentive one. But, contrary to the FGT, the SGT is, as mentioned, a still-
emerging research program. As such, its boundaries are not yet fully defined. It can therefore 
still easily accommodate the knowledge motivation for decentralization. Indeed, I will later 
suggest that Tiebout’s work can be regarded not only as one of the seminal works of the FGT, 
                                                 
3 In the same spirit, decentralization moreover generates new knowledge, especially about policy options, because it enables 
federated states to perform various sorts of social experiments autonomously. Such experiments lead to diffused benefits 
within the federation as a whole because the various states, including the central one, can learn from the failures and 
successes of others. This related knowledge motivation for decentralization finds perhaps its clearest statement in Bryce 
(2004[1888], p. 257) and, later, United States jurisprudence: New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 282, (1932) (Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis, dissenting). See also the opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, (1919) and Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, (1921) who, dissenting, defended the experimental nature of the First 
and the Fourteenth US Constitutional Amendments respectively. Justice Brandeis agreed with Justice Holmes in these cases. 
Though the laboratory role of federalism is related to the knowledge approach discussed here, a detailed discussion of it lies 
outside the scope of the present paper; but for an attempt to discuss the laboratory role in terms of the SGT, see Garzarelli 
(2004).   4 
but also, if indirectly, as a contribution containing the basics of a knowledge-based 
organizational approach that could complement the SGT. 
3. First Generation, Second Generation, and Other Theories of Fiscal Federalism 
The FGT, as just noted, favors federalism on knowledge grounds. By bringing the consumer-
voter closer to the state, it suggests that decentralization helps to solve the value problem of 
the public sphere, that is, the problem of how to husband utility of a nonexcludable and 
nonrival good at efficient cost. The quintessence of such belief is arguably Oates’s 
Decentralization Theorem, which proposes that “in the absence of cost-savings from the 
centralized provision of” a local public “good and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level 
of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of 
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972, p. 54, original emphasis). 
  The justification of such normative proposition – by Oates’s (1999, pp. 1122-4) own 
admission – is disarmingly simple. As de Tocqueville and Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 
implied, there’s a higher probability of matching local public good demand if public good 
supply is not centralized, i.e., uniform across jurisdictions. When the Theorem doesn’t hold, 
the central government will internalize (through grants-in-aid) interjurisdictional externalities 
until the federation’s marginal social benefits equal marginal cost. 
  Such FGT conception is a legacy of the Samuelson (1954, 1955), Musgrave (1959) 
and Arrow (e.g., 1977[1969]) public finance tradition. Since this tradition determines the 
internal functioning of state organization residually, it favors a familiar market failure 
argument the presumption of which is that both central and local governments act in the 
public interest. The main stimulus for the birth of the SGT is such anonymous conception of 
the state innate in the FGT. Much like the theory of the firm before Coase (1937), in fact, that 
sees organization as mere production function, the SGT does not consider the state as an   5 
organization. Simply put, it does not envision the state as a structure with problems of, for 
example, low-powered incentives and opportunistic behavior. 
  Be that as it may, the concrete matter of contempt raised by the SGT is that an 
anonymous conception of the state blocks off several avenues of theoretical investigation that 
could offer valuable information about the different public accountability effects of 
alternative public governance structures. Or, seen from a different perspective, the SGT 
contends that an organizational approach to local public finance can cast a brighter light on 
the incentive-aligning effects of decentralization. The SGT hence proposes to study such 
familiar issues as the possible transaction-cost minimizing role of the state, the proper 
assignment of decision rights among levels of government, and the alignment of incentives in 
the vertical structure of the public sector through the lens of contemporary organization 
theory. Let us briefly consider three SGT contributions from the transaction cost (or New 
Institutional) economics, incomplete contract and principal-agent perspectives to render this 
point a little more concrete.
4 
  Weingast’s (1995, p. 1) SGT contribution is motivated by the following “fundamental 
political dilemma”: a “government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce 
contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” The weak 
accountability constraints embodied in many public governance structures make politicians 
suffer from commitment myopia. One public governance structure that seems to work at 
different times and places – i.e., that allows for limited political intervention through 
economic checks and balances – is, suggests Weingast, federalism. Weingast accordingly 
calls his suggested SGT approach to decentralized public organization market-preserving 
federalism. The upshot of market-preserving federalism is that competing jurisdictions create 
incentives for credible commitments and lower transaction costs. 
                                                 
4 See Oates (2004) for a more extensive and detailed review of the relevant literature.   6 
  Seabright (1996) uses the “incomplete contract” (or “new property right”) approach to 
analyze fiscal federalism (see also Crémer et al. 1996). The typical setting of the incomplete 
contract framework is, of course, the firm; indeed, the party who manages to minimize rent-
seeking costs is usually the owner of the firm. But since incomplete contracts include 
political mandates, constitutions and treaties, another setting could be public governance 
structures. It is thus suggested that a central government can maximize collective welfare 
through the possession of the residual rights for policy alignment among local governments – 
that is, for the offsetting of externalities among federated states. But the central government 
need not always act in the best interest of citizens; whereas decentralization, it is pointed out, 
can increase political accountability. In light of this trade-off, Seabright’s model suggests that 
political accountability can be an organizational motivation for decentralization in spite of 
lack of difference of taste among local jurisdictions. 
  Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2003) use one of the models proposed by the so-called 
common agency theory to explore the decentralization versus centralization decision. Like in 
the incomplete contract SGT approach, they suggest that interjurisdictional preference 
heterogeneity is not a sufficient condition to justify fiscal federalism: incentives also matter. 
They point out that a federally organized state may be a more efficient governance structure 
than a centralized one also – if not above all – for citizens (principals) to control politicians 
(agents).
5 
  Before proceeding to Tiebout I would like to succinctly make reference to two other 
approaches present in the literature that share similar concerns. These approaches are the 
Public Choice (PC) and the derived Political Economics. 
                                                 
5 Take note that the definition of who is the principal and who the agent in organizational models of fiscal federalism is a 
relative one; some studies view the central government as the principal. Josselin and Marciano (2004) offer a historical 
analysis of competition over principalship by using US Constitutional history as a case study, showing that such competition 
can cause conflicts among states and also vary principalship through time.   7 
  The general organizational emphasis on incentives borrowed from organization theory 
that is now explicitly advocated in the subdiscipline of fiscal federalism does not imply that 
the overarching public economics literature has entirely neglected the organizational 
dimension of the public sector. PC has in fact made organization writ large a substantial part 
of its research program. Indeed, already in one of his earliest contributions Buchanan was 
unambiguous about the organizational nature of the state: the state is one instance of division 
of labor that emerges in order to pursue some ends through collective action, i.e., it is nothing 
more than the summation of individual wills the public cost curve of which (abstractly) 
remains an average and not a marginal one (Buchanan 1949, p. 498). 
  For our purposes, the more specific issue to underscore is that in PC federalism 
basically enters the picture as a way to limit the grip of the fisc.
6 Decentralized public finance 
defines the proper scope and objective of government by allowing for competition among 
various levels of government. It creates incentives by injecting some market characteristics 
into the public, especially political, sphere. The incentive function of federalism is double: to 
limit the discretion of central state action and to limit the extraction of consumer-voters’ 
surplus by local jurisdictions.
7 In sum, PC is principally concerned with avoiding a Leviathan 
state, and sees decentralization as one way to achieve this. 
  Persson and Tabellini (1996) focus on incentive issues among countries or regions that 
have decided to partake in macroeconomic risk. They point out that, under asymmetric 
information, the sharing of risk leads to the familiar moral hazard problem: when the 
                                                 
6 The more general Auster and Silver (1979) uses some industrial organization theory in what is an essentially PC framework 
to analyze the functions (or the output) of the state (but still considers state organization as a production function). For the 
distilled essence of the differences between the traditional public finance and Public Choice approaches see Buchanan and 
Musgrave (1999), wherein pages 155-202 are also dedicated to federalism. The work of Vincent Ostrom (e.g., 1987[1971] 
and Ostrom et al. 1961) is in some ways forerunning as well. 
7 The theme is also present in the subsequent New Institutional Economics or transaction cost literature (e.g., North 1981; 
Weingast 1995) that, as we saw, the SGT more explicitly views as central to its ken. In fact, at least prima facie, the only 
dividing line on the matter between the New Institutional Economics and PC would seem be the origin of the state. Through 
conjectural history, PC sees a contractual origin of the state (Brennan and Buchanan 1985); the New Institutional Economics 
conversely leaves matters open. North writes: whether “the state originated as a predatory group attacking and exploiting a 
peasant village – a predatory origin of the state – or developed out of the communal needs for organization of the peasant 
village – a contract origin of the state – cannot be resolved” (North 1981, p. 64).   8 
principal (e.g., the EU central government) is the one offering the insurance protection, there 
is a high probability that the agents (EU member states) will work below their potential (e.g., 
will not fully absorb local macroeconomic shocks). The question that emerges is then of 
organizational design: which incentive structure best balances out the risk-sharing-moral 
hazard trade-off? Drawing on the incomplete contract, principal agent, and voting literatures 
in their Political Economics approach Persson and Tabellini conclude that, in certain cases, it 
is possible that a federal fiscal constitution allowing for centralized insurance protection can 
curb the distortions generated by moral hazard. 
4. Tiebout: A Rereading 
The previous section points out that, contrary to the FGT, the SGT and other germane 
economic theories not only put forth an organizational argument for decentralization, but that 
such argument primarily hinges on an incentive-based motivation. This section rereads 
Tiebout’s seminal contribution. It attempts to show that, similarly to the FGT, Tiebout offers 
a knowledge-based motivation for decentralization. But, unlike the FGT, such motivation is 
adduced by Tiebout on organizational grounds.
8 
  Tiebout’s “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures” is a critique of the Samuelson 
public finance argument
9. In the Samuelson argument, public good allocation is often not 
‘optimal.’ Unlike a market setting where consumers and producers reveal their preferences 
for private goods through supply and demand interaction, there is no market-type solution to 
determine the level of expenditure of public goods. The typical outcome in a public setting is 
in fact free-riding. The nonexcludability and nonrivalry properties of a public good assure 
that the public good is consumed irrespective of complete preference revelation. A 
                                                 
8 Seabright (1996, p. 63, note 3) agrees: “Tiebout’s model is best seen as a pioneering contribution to the theory of 
mechanism design, rather than saying anything about the decentralization of power in government.” 
9 And thus also of the subsequent Musgrave and Arrow one.   9 
constituent – ‘consumer-voter’ – tends to minimize preference revelation, a magnitude 
directly related to personal tax burden, for he understands that he will still enjoy the public 
good thanks to the taxes paid by others. This ‘market failure’ calls, in the Samuelson 
argument, for state intervention along Pigouvian lines. 
  But two major questions arise. First, how can the state ‘force’ the full disclosure of 
consumer-voter preferences? Second, assuming full disclosure, can these preferences be 
satisfied like in a private goods market? Answering these questions is equivalent, according 
to Tiebout, to finding the ‘optimal’ solution to the problem of taxation. And the answer to 
these questions, Tiebout further observes, rests on devising “social institutions” (Tiebout 
1956, p. 418) that lead to market-like organization in the public sector, viz., in organizing the 
public sector so that it allows consumer sovereignty in the form of spatial mobility among 
competing jurisdictions according to public good preference. 
  Tiebout hence presents a model of local government expenditure that tries to 
determine the optimal level of public goods through a mechanism of preference revelation of 
the consumer-voter. He criticizes the Samuelson assumption that expenditures for public 
goods are handled at the central government level by arguing that several government 
services are provided at the local level too. Accordingly, he presents a spatial mobility model 
wherein the consumer-voter selects his preferred supply of public good by selecting among 
competing local jurisdictions: the consumer-voter discretionally moves to that community 
that most satisfies his set of preferences. The Tiebout model is in this manner able to 
represent the preferences of the population more adequately than national level models; and 
at the same time yield a solution for the level of expenditures for local public goods. Thus, it 
was later said that in the Tiebout model people vote with their feet. 
  As Tiebout himself often underscores in his article, he is presenting a model with 
extreme assumptions. But what he was after in his purely theoretical piece, we hinted, is   10 
actually an organizational design problem. To Tiebout the attempt to approximate a market of 
the public sector, as it were, is in fact nothing more than a heuristic expedient devised to 
illustrate an organizational design issue or, if you prefer, a knowledge problem.
10 It is an 
informational or public-good externality that impedes the optimal amount of public good 
provision. In different terms, the reason for the lack of equivalence between the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution and marginal cost à la Samuelson may be organizational. 
  This is particularly clear if one thinks that the optimal amount of public good 
provision is a relative or comparative matter: it varies with jurisdiction, notwithstanding 
mobility. As Oates recently observes in reference to the Tiebout model,  
the gains from decentralization, although typically enhanced by … mobility, are by 
no means wholly dependent on them. … In fact, if there were absolutely nothing 
mobile – households, factors, or whatever – there would still exist, in general, gains 
from decentralization. The point here is simply that even in the absence of mobility, 
the efficient level of output of a ‘local’ public good, as determined by the Samuelson 
condition that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution equals marginal cost, 
will typically vary from one jurisdiction to another. To take one example, the 
efficient level of air quality in Los Angeles is surely much different from that in, 
say, Chicago (Oates 1999, p. 1124, my emphasis). 
  This point is important, for it shifts the focus of attention from market failure 
considerations to comparative institutional analysis. This opens the door to the consideration 
of different institutional or organizational arrangements for the internalization not only of 
physical and spatial externalities, such as nuisance and pollution, but also of those concerning 
production and exchange, or, in a word, organization. Relatedly, the emphasis on such other 
externalities does not a priori rule out that some organizational arrangements emerge not only 
to obviate detrimental but also to generate beneficial externalities of the same (and other) 
                                                 
10 Fischel (2001, pp. 35 ff.) reports a personal anecdote. He learned from a conversation with Musgrave in 1994 that Tiebout 
had been a graduate student in Musgrave’s class on public finance at Michigan. And that in such class Tiebout had the 
original idea about his now well-known model. But Tiebout, continued Musgrave, had brought up the idea in a jokingly 
manner – to not be taken too seriously. So, Tiebout’s sense of humor – reported by many to be wonderful – is the primary 
culprit behind a contribution that Tiebout himself thought should not be taken too literally, but as an instance of provocation.   11 
type.
11 As Tiebout (1956, p. 423) puts it, policies “that promote residential mobility and 
increase the knowledge of the consumer-voter will improve the allocation of government 
expenditures in the same sense that mobility among jobs and knowledge relevant to the 
location of industry and labor improve the allocation of private resources.” 
  This other reading of Tiebout hints to a knowledge motivation for federalism from the 
organizational viewpoint. Indeed, although Tiebout arguably leaves matters open as concerns 
possible advantages of local government in internalizing public-goods or information type 
externalities (Crémer et al. 1996, pp. 41-3), the role played by taxes in his model is 
nonetheless a knowledge one: taxes perform a communication function for local public goods 
similar to that of the price system for private goods. And it is the induced competition among 
alternative organizational forms that transmits such knowledge; that reduces the uncertainty 
tied to marginal public good pricing. 
  Tiebout can, therefore, be interpreted as implicitly endorsing an avant la lettre 
comparative institutional analysis of two alternative governance structures of the public 
sector on knowledge grounds. The implied alternative real-world structures for preference 
revelation that are compared are the voting mechanism and local public finance. And the 
balance, as known, tips in favor of local public finance. But the spirit of comparative 
institutional analysis is in Tiebout as well. “A general reduction of costs along with a 
reduction in one or more of the services provided cannot be justified on economic grounds 
unless the social welfare function is known. For example, those who argue for a metropolitan 
police force cannot prove their case on purely economic grounds. … If one of the 
communities were to receive less police protection after integration than it received before, 
integration could be objected to as a violation of consumer’s choice” (Tiebout 1956, p. 423). 
                                                 
11 Cf., for instance, Coase (1960), Demsetz (1969), Dahlman (1979), Crémer et al. (1996), and Langlois and Foss (1999). 
This point also emerged earlier in the specific context of the organization of local governments in Ostrom’s work on water 
supply, see for instance his later work with Tiebout and Warren, which also offers a summary of such point: Ostrom et al. 
(1961, pp. 838ff.). Developing this connection in detail here would lead us too far astray.   12 
  In the Tiebout model the parties involved in the bargaining or communication process 
are the consumer-voters and the state qua organization. And it is the state that by means of 
this process should respond effectively to the needs of the consumer-voter (Tiebout 1956, p. 
417). In the “Tiebout model,” specifies for example Oates, “local jurisdictions use benefit 
taxes that effectively communicate to households the cost of consuming different levels of 
local public goods; this results in an efficient pattern of consumption of these goods. But this 
is true not only for households. If local governments provide local inputs that increase the 
productivity of capital employed in their jurisdictions, then they should levy benefit taxes on 
capital in order to provide the set of signals needed for the efficient deployment of capital 
across localities …” (Oates 1999, p. 1125, emphasis added). 
  Or, to put it all in different words, when preference heterogeneity is high, it makes 
economic sense, for the provision of public goods, to reduce the ‘cognitive distance’ between 
the consumer-voter and the polity. The minimization of cognitive distance between the 
consumer-voter and the polity through fiscal decentralization is the ‘program’ one wishes to 
solve when searching the solution space of the vertical organization of the public sector. 
Because it involves specific knowledge, the solution to this program is necessarily an 
organizational one: creating local jurisdictions for consumer-voter mobility. 
  Let me take care at this point not to be misunderstood. I am not maintaining that the 
Tiebout model is a break from ‘conventional’ theory. That is, there is no doubt that the 
implicit benchmark against which the rhetoric of the Tiebout model rests is that of perfect 
competition theory – a theory devoid of any institutional or organizational substance
12. If we 
nevertheless separate the rhetorical chaff from the substantive wheat we perceive a viewpoint 
that suggests that comparative organizational or institutional considerations are of the essence 
                                                 
12 On which see, for example, Vihanto (1992).   13 
for questions concerning the vertical structure of the public sector.
13 In brief, the Tiebout 
model embeds – if obliquely – an organizational view of public sector decentralization that 
emphasizes the knowledge motivation that the SGT has yet to consider. 
5. Conclusion 
This explorative work contributes to the Second Generation Theory of fiscal federalism. It 
begins by introducing the two classic motivations in favor of federalism, namely, incentive-
alignment and knowledge. Then, it discusses the organizational approach that the SGT and 
other public economics literatures offer, and finds that they mostly focus on the incentive, 
rather than knowledge, motivation for decentralization. Finally, it points out that the Tiebout 
model already embeds an organizational approach that rests on a knowledge motivation, 
allowing us to discuss some knowledge functions of fiscal federalism from an organizational 
viewpoint. Table 1 below provides a summary in the form of a taxonomy. 
Table 1: A Taxonomic Summary 
  FGT  SGT 
so far  PC  Political 
Economics  Tiebout  Suggested 
SGT 
Organizational 








  Though this paper ultimately proposes that a SGT worthy of this name should include 
both the incentive and knowledge motivations for fiscal decentralization, it has not provided a 
                                                 
13 In fact, what more precisely Tiebout intentionally leaves out from his local public finance contribution is the political facet 
of the supply side. He is most explicit about this in his later contribution on the matter: this “paper is concerned with fiscal 
federalism – fiscal decentralization – purely from the point of view of economic efficiency. Alternatively stated, the problem 
is defined such that – as nearly as possible – political federalism is neutral” (Tiebout 1961, p. 79). This indirectly reinforces 
my view that Tiebout adduces a knowledge motivation for federalism. Cf. Fischel (2001).   14 
polished theory of such proposition. Rather, it presented a sort of intellectual progress report. 
In order to provide a theory of such proposition, future studies should: (1) include a detailed 
discussion of knowledge-based approaches to economic organization with which the SGT 
may ally itself with; and (2) attempt to develop an organizational model of fiscal federalism 
based on the knowledge motivation. 
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